IN TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

The Israel/Palestine Initiative: Talks towards Achieving a Two-State Solution

Contents

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The purpose of the following analysis is to document In Transformation Initiative's (ITI) involvement in the Israel/Palestine project, assess the engagement strategies used, determine which guiding principles from the South African peace and reconciliation process were shared, and identify the lessons learnt from ITI's approach in such a pre-transitional phase context. Much of the case study is based on ITI's internal documentation on the project, while relevant literature from the field of peacebuilding and mediation was used to support lessons emerging from the case study. Additionally, interviews were conducted with four ITI directors and one member of the main partner organisation involved in the Israel/Palestine initiative.

The conflict between Palestine and Israel can be considered one of the world's lengthiest and most controversial. At its core, the conflict is between two self-determination movements, the Jewish Zionist project and the Palestinian nationalist project, which both claim the same territory. Tension between the two peoples resulted in violent conflicts over territorial boundaries from the 1940s to the 1970s, with numerous other clashes and uprisings continuing into the 21st century. Several attempts at facilitating peace between Israel and Palestine have been made by international peace and mediation organisations and through intergovernmental efforts such as the Camp David Accords in 1979 and the ongoing 1993 Oslo Accords.

Tensions between Israelis and Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank remain high, with Palestinian protests over the Israel/Palestine borders continuing during 2020. Relations between the two peoples are at a stalemate and the current right-wing Israeli government is sceptical of concessions to the Palestinians. Yet there are groups on both the Israeli and the Palestinian side of the conflict that recognise the necessity of a two-state solution despite the conflict's becoming increasingly obstinate.

During ITI's intervention in 2016 Israel faced a crisis of confidence in its government. The broadening of the Netanyahu parliamentary coalition was expected to lead to a further diplomatic stalemate and a strengthening of extremist forces within Israel. However, a rare window of opportunity presented itself when Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries expressed interest in the normalisation of relations, conditional upon progress in the peace process with the Palestinians.

ITI partnered with the Boston-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) Beyond Conflict and an Israeli non-partisan organisation, Blue White Future, to host private dialogue sessions between influential Palestinian and Israeli

Palestinian protests of the Israel/Palestine borders continued during 2020

leaders towards sharing ideas on how to find an alternative to the current deadlock. The aim was to facilitate dialogue towards peace for Israelis and Palestinians to demonstrate that a mutually beneficial solution can be achieved. This process included reviewing visits to South Africa, as well as ITI visits to the region.

Activities carried out by ITI and Beyond Conflict during the initiative included multiple consultative pre-negotiation meetings with stakeholders in the Israeli civil society and security establishment through visits to Jerusalem. There were also visits to Ramallah, Qatar and Tel Aviv, where the team engaged with leaders from Hamas, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Fattah. The objective of these meetings was to bring participants to the point where they would consider participating in dialogue to discuss possible track two talks. Additionally, ITI and Beyond Conflict hosted Israeli civil society leaders in South Africa where they engaged with individuals who had taken part in the peacemaking process.

Several lessons can be learnt from ITI's approach in the Israel/Palestine initiative.

- Accessing and analysing the context of the conflict is vital to identify areas where assistance is needed.

- Working and collaborating with other strategic global, regional and national organisations is critical in lending legitimacy to the facilitators, as well as bringing skills and networks that are beneficial to the peace process.

- South Africa's transition experience and the fundamental principles of the negotiation process, including designing an inclusive dialogue and negotiation process, can be shared effectively.

- Lasting solutions to a conflict must be developed collectively by the participants and within the framework of their unique political context.

- Dialogue can be used as a means to facilitate engagements between stakeholders that provide opportunities for discussions in a private and secure environment that fit the political reality and limitations of the project context.

- Hosting delegations in South Africa is effective and has a transformative effect on participants when they engage with key individuals involved in the South African transition process.

- ITI's successful personality-driven approach and strategic method, along with the political capital and experience of its directors, is a unique and characterising aspect of the organisation.

Hosting delegations in South Africa has a transformative effect on participants

INTRODUCTION

This case study serves as an analysis of ITI's work in the Israel/ Palestine initiative. It forms part of a series of case study analyses based on specific country projects in which ITI has been involved since its establishment in 2013. The purpose is to assess the methodology behind ITI's approach to peacemaking, determine how the guiding principles stemming from the South African transition experience were shared during the project, and identify the lessons that can be learnt from ITI's approach within a pre-transitional phase context such as the Israel/Palestine conflict. Moreover, the case study analysis will contribute to developing a learning framework on effective practices and approaches in peacebuilding. The studies will be shared with practitioners in the field of peacebuilding to provide opportunities for reflection and dialogue around peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The analysis enhances ITI's own work by reflecting on its approaches, lessons learnt and the manner in which it engages in peacebuilding projects. The Israel/Palestine case study analysis is based on ITI's internal documents, project proposals, feedback reports and annual funding reports. Several interviews were also conducted with three members of the ITI directorate,[1] as well as one member[2] of the partner organisation involved in the intervention. Relevant literature from the field of peacebuilding and mediation was used to support lessons emerging from the case study data.

The conflict between Israel and Palestine has persisted for decades, with the primary dispute being over land.[3] The current political conflict began in the early 20th century when Jews fleeing persecution in Europe wanted to establish a 'national homeland' within what was then an Arab and Muslim majority territory located in the Ottoman and later British Empire. Between the 1920s and 40s the number of Jews arriving in the territory increased, with many fleeing persecution in Europe and seeking a homeland after the Holocaust of the Second World War. Tensions between the two peoples increased and the Arab majority resisted efforts by both Israelis and the British to establish a 'national home' in Palestine for Jewish people. The United Nations (UN) attempted to implement a plan to give each group part of the land, but this initiative was unsuccessful. Consequently, Israel and surrounding Arab nations have fought several wars over the territory.

The territorial boundaries are largely a reflection of the two wars fought in the region in 1948 and 1967. In 1947, the UN voted to split the contested territory in three, allocating one to Jews and one to Arabs, with an international trusteeship regime in Jerusalem.[4] However, the Arabs rejected this plan, leading to the 1948 Arab–Israeli war. This war saw approximately 700 000 Palestinians flee in a mass exodus known as the 'Nakba' (Arabic

> The conflict has persisted for decades, with the primary dispute being over land

for 'catastrophe').[5] The 1948 war remains a central, unresolved part of the ongoing conflict. Israel gained control of the disputed territory, except the West Bank and Jerusalem's eastern quarter (controlled by Jordan), and the Gaza Strip (controlled by Egypt).

During the 1967 war, which lasted six days, Israel defeated the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces, which resulted in its taking the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan. Successive wars resulted in minor shifts of territory until the Yom Kippur War[6] in October 1973, when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel owing to Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The conflict was to a certain degree calmed by the Camp David Accords in 1979, which bound Egypt and Israel in a peace treaty.[7] Once the wars over the territory ended, a surge of uprisings and violence among Palestinians ensued in the First Intifada in 1987.[8] This was an uprising involving hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[9] The Oslo Accords of 1993 followed to mediate the conflict and establish a framework for the Palestinians to govern themselves, while also creating relations between the Israeli government and the newly established Palestinian Authority (PA). However, in 2000 the Second Intifada began.[10]

This second and more violent uprising was in reaction to Palestinians' grievances over the Israeli occupation and what was considered provocation when Israeli politician Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, also known as Al-Haram Al-Sharif – an area sacred to both Jews and Muslims. In 2013, the United States (US) attempted to revive the peace process between the Israeli government and the PA in the West Bank.[11] However, peace talks were disrupted when the PA's ruling party, Fatah, formed a unity government with the Hamas political faction in 2014. Reconciliation processes between these parties have proceeded tentatively in the past 24 years with an additional unity plan signed in 2017.

Currently, the West Bank is nominally controlled by the PA and is under Israeli occupation, as Israeli troops are tasked with enforcing security restrictions on Palestinians' movements and activities.[12] Additionally, in the past 50 years Israel has built settlements occupied by more than 600 000 Jews in these areas. Gaza is controlled by Hamas and is under Israeli blockade but not ground troop occupation. Tensions are often high between Israel and Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank.

Furthermore, after a wave of violence between Israelis and Palestinians in 2015, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced that Palestinians would no longer be bound by the Oslo Accords.[13] Violence between Palestinians and Israelis escalated during 2015 and 2016. This culminated in increased protests by Palestinians at the border between Gaza and Israel against Israeli occupation, as well as violent attacks by individual Palestinians against Israelis known as the 'Intifada of the Individuals'.[14]

During the 1967 war Israel defeated the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces

ITI's involvement in the Israel/Palestine project was motivated by several trust-building meetings and discussions in early 2015 with Israelis and Palestinians. During this time ITI was engaging with Beyond Conflict[15] regarding the concept of the project. This was based on the reality that the peace process between Israel and Palestine was progressing, with a subsequent need for meaningful talks and a vision accepted by both Israeli and Palestinian leaders and, importantly, the various constituencies. The initial meeting to conceptualise the project was held in Cyprus in 2015, bringing together members of the ITI directorate, and Beyond Conflict's CEO and founder Tim Phillips[16] and Senior Program Officer Lee-Or Ankori-Karlinsky, as well as Israelis from the non-partisan political movement Blue White Future,[17] who were introduced to the project through Beyond Conflict.

The initial foundation of the project, which would be known as Neighbors, was that there was a unique opportunity for progress towards Israeli–Palestinian peace.[18] One of the reasons for this belief was that the contours of a negotiated peace are well known, because of the numerous peace initiatives undertaken in the previous 15 years. Moreover, decades of public opinion surveys indicated that the majority of Israelis and Palestinians consistently support a two-state solution. More importantly, in 2015, when the initiative began to take shape, the regional and international environment presented the expectation of a fruitful engagement through the emerging partnership between Sunni Arab countries and Israel. Furthermore, three strategic milestones offered significant opportunities for momentum towards engagement. These were the formation of a new US administration with the upcoming 2016 elections, the 50th anniversary of the 1967 war and the 70th anniversary of the founding of the state of Israel.

Therefore, ITI and Beyond Conflict saw an opportunity to initiate a viable process that could transform these opportunities into pressure towards progress on a path to peace between Israelis and Palestinians.[19] To achieve this purpose ITI and Beyond Conflict aimed to convene a small, high-level group of 8–10 prominent Israelis and Palestinians to develop a shared vision for the future. The engagement would bring together a broad selection of Palestinian and Israeli society, including groups and individuals who had never engaged with one another before. These included political, religious and civil society leaders. This meeting was significant in that it created the opportunity to reduce mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians.

In doing this, the team hoped to develop a solution towards a two-state reality that could be shared with the Israeli, Palestinian and Middle Eastern people and leaders, as well as the international community, in an attempt to break the peace talk stalemate and demonstrate that a long-term and lasting solution was possible. Simultaneously, the South African connection with Palestine and ITI's parallel project with the Institute of Palestine and South Africa (IPSA)[20] on the Palestine national project was an important factor in

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
creating momentum towards eventual track two peace talks between Palestine and Israel.

One of the main challenges was to determine how to counter the lack of trust between Palestinian and Israeli leaders.[21] Through continuous efforts by both ITI and Beyond Conflict, the team was able to bring a small group of leaders from both Israel and Palestine together in South Africa. This move was designed to facilitate discussions in a neutral space that encouraged more informal interaction, which could form the basis for building trust and opportunities for future collaboration. The groups agreed to meet on the premise of exploratory talks, without the prerequisite of commitment to an agreement. These talks were to be carried out in private and highly secure meetings. Targeting and having access to top leadership is one of ITI's key practices. The major advantage of targeting high-level leadership is that these individuals can make decisions and can influence and shift the perceptions of their constituencies towards peaceful resolutions.

The second challenge was the vast division between the majority of moderate Israelis/Palestinians in favour of a two-state solution, and the hard-line conservatives who do not seek to implement any parameters relating to a two-state reality, exacerbated by the increasingly right-wing policies and measures of the Knesset.[22] Although most constituents are in favour of a sustainable peace, there is a lack of confidence that a two-state solution can be realised. Beyond Conflict's link with Blue White Future became a crucial factor in identifying and gaining access to moderate Israelis who could lend support, credibility and momentum to the process. Blue White Future took the lead in organising dialogue engagements with settlers and a group of Israeli leaders, as well as in coordinating with civil society groups to intensify internal dialogue across different Israeli constituencies.

The challenge was the division between the majority of moderates and hard-line conservatives

LESSONS LEARNT

The case study is based on the lessons learnt from ITI's approach to peacebuilding, which shares the fundamental principles that underpinned the South African transition experience. The principles and mechanisms used during the South African negotiations, reconciliation and subsequent transition serve as a valuable and relevant model of peacebuilding.[23] ITI uses this model as a reference point for its engagement in countries experiencing conflict. This analysis documents the engagement strategies employed and insights gained from the impact of ITI's approach in this context, and determines the lessons that can be learnt from ITI's experience.

FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF ITI

ITI's approach to peacebuilding initiatives and political transitions is based on three foundational principles: trust, inclusivity and ownership.[24] These principles were critical to the South African negotiation process, which in due course led to a peaceful transition to a democratic state. Therefore, ITI ensures that the value and practical application of these principles are effectively communicated and demonstrated to stakeholders during an intervention.

Principle-Based Approach

ITI's principle-based approach has proven that the absence of these principles may inhibit the success and sustainability of a peace resolution or agreement. ITI acknowledges that each conflict is unique,[25] and therefore the manner in which these principles are applied in each specific country context may differ and be adapted to address the specific needs of stakeholders. This approach enables ITI to establish a foundation through which it emphasizes the essentiality and advantages of the principles during a peace process, while leaving room for their application to be adapted.

Sharing the South African Transition Experience

The South African experience continues to be referenced as a successful example of a peaceful transition to democracy. During the country's negotiation period, a combination of favourable political, institutional, social and leadership factors was needed to steer the negotiation process towards the necessary consensus and compromises.[26] Additionally, analysing the South African transition experience has illustrated that commitment from political leadership and the community to achieving peace, de-escalating violence and a finding common destiny was imperative in the negotiation process.[27]

Laurie Nathan's assessment of South Africa's successful transition to democracy recognises that political leaders were able to build and achieve high levels of trust, which was vital in shifting the political relations from mistrust and suspicion towards normalising compromises and accepting

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assurances from political opponents.[28] Nathan also notes that the structure of the negotiation process included all political parties in the country, as well as all sectors of civil society. This enabled broad participation in debates on reconciliation, as well as the formation of a new constitution, which strengthened the legitimacy and ownership of both the process and outcomes of the talks.[29]

ITI's theory of change is based on this experience and the directors' knowledge of and involvement in the South African transition process.[30] ITI was able to share some of the lessons from the South African experience through facilitating engagements with members of Israeli civil society and the security establishment. Key lessons included the following:[31]

• Local ownership of peace initiatives is critical for developing a peaceful solution that caters to the political and social context of the conflict.

• In the case of armed conflicts, the military and security sectors play a critical role in initiating dialogue towards peace talks or negotiations.

• Inclusivity in the peacemaking process provides opportunities for the input and participation of all stakeholders in the conflict.

• It is necessary and important for negotiating parties to manage the dialogue process while maintaining internal support and commitment to the process. By so doing, negotiating parties can respond to the changing environment without losing focus.

• Sustaining negotiations amid conflict and incidents of provocation or violence builds incremental momentum and creates opportunities for areas of mutual agreement that can ultimately lead to a peaceful resolution.

• Persistence is a key requirement in protracted conflicts as it enables parties to go beyond failed attempts and explore new directions in search of a peaceful solution.

Moreover, the perspective of Roelf Meyer, an ITI director, shared through his involvement in the South African transition process as the former National Party chief negotiator during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) talks,[32] had the potential to impact Israeli stakeholders. Meyer's experience as a former security official could also play a significant role during engagements with security officials from the Israeli centre-right regarding the reinvigoration of talks with Palestine.

The Role of Trust in Creating Momentum for Track Two Talks

During a negotiation or peace process, trust in the facilitators and between stakeholders is one of the most critical binding elements in reaching a solution. Trust is often the element that determines the legitimacy and longevity of a process and its outcomes, while the existence of trust prior to negotiations can simplify the negotiation process.[33] For facilitators, gaining and maintaining the trust of participants is vital in initiating the negotiation process and sustaining its momentum. Therefore, facilitators must be able to demonstrate that they

Trust in the facilitators is one of the most critical binding elements in reaching a solution

possess the necessary capabilities, experience, credibility and integrity to be a trustworthy partner during negotiation.

Both ITI and Beyond Conflict recognise the importance of owning these qualities to gain the trust of stakeholders. Consequently, throughout its initiatives ITI focuses extensively on building relationships with different stakeholders before a negotiation is initiated. The organisation is able to implement this principle by engaging in pre-engagement consultations with all participants, while also emphasizing the neutrality of the organisation by communicating with all stakeholders in a transparent manner.

Throughout the project, ITI and Beyond Conflict conducted extensive consultative engagements and facilitated a workshop and small-scale dialogue forums, with the intent to create a foundation for engagement between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, influential individuals and civil society members.

ITI's involvement in the Israel/Palestine project was made possible by the trust engendered by South Africa's own unique peace process and historical reconciliation. ITI's principled stance of taking part in the process with neutrality, notwithstanding the parties involved in the context, was imperative. This was acknowledged and appreciated by both Israel and Palestine.

Promoting an Inclusive Process

Research has shown that negotiated conflicts and political transitions are often more sustainable when additional stakeholders such as civil society and other political groups are also included.[34] However, mediators and negotiators may be hesitant to broaden the inclusivity of the process for reasons that include the complications that competing ideologies or positions on the conflict/solutions may bring, making it difficult to reach a consensus; possible coalitions between actors that can polarise the process; the necessity to extend the timeframe of negotiations owing to a large number of stakeholders' participating; and the risk that broad participation may not be compatible with the requirements of the context, e.g. secrecy/talks outside of public knowledge.[35]

However, evidence has shown that selecting a small sample of actors to make decisions on behalf of entire populations also presents challenges to the process in terms of a lack of representation, the legitimacy of the process, possible accusations of bias and corruption, and ultimately, a lack of ownership of and support for the resolutions and agreements reached.[36] ITI thus supports broad and inclusive negotiation processes, despite the resistance and complications these present.

ITI also remains aware of the sensitivity and discretion needed in specific contexts where the conflict parameters are fragile. Hence, some contexts may warrant an approach that initially only includes a select group of participants, with the intention of broadening the stakeholders at a later

Selecting a small sample of actors to make decisions on behalf of the population presents challenges

stage. However, the foundational principle of inclusivity remains resolute in ITI's approach.

The team stressed that a sustainable and viable solution to achieve a two-state reality had to be conceived by all parties involved and could not be one-sided. The process of formulating a proposed solution must be consultative to maintain ownership of the process and the final outcome. ITI and Beyond Conflict continuously engaged with officials from the Palestinian political leadership groups, as well as influential moderate Israelis both in Israel and in American Jewish lobby groups, to motivate traction regarding engagements between the stakeholders. The aim was to get the parties to agree to track two talks towards Israeli/Palestinian peace by bringing together a small core group of individuals from both Israel and Palestine for 'talks about talks', broadening the stakeholder involvement at a later stage.

Despite apprehensions from Palestinian political groups about engaging with Israelis on the issue, ITI and Beyond Conflict's extensive and persistent consultative and trust-building meetings with stakeholders resulted in one private off-the-record meeting between Palestinians and Israelis in Cape Town, South Africa in July 2016. The strategy was to first engage with the individual parties and groupings and gain their trust, as well as understand their position and interests; and to then propose and discuss the value and necessity of dialogue with other stakeholders. However, the decisions to engage in dialogue at any point remain with the individual stakeholders.

### Emphasising Ownership over Developing a Solution

The Oslo Accords were initially celebrated as a breakthrough in the conflict, but the process failed to bring an end to the violence and distrust between the two nations. It can be argued that if all stakeholders had ownership of the process, there would have been more willingness to pursue viable and sustainable outcomes despite the obstacles that arise once an agreement is in place.[37]

ITI's approach to any initiative is rooted in promoting ownership of the process and aims to facilitate, empower and support stakeholders to develop and design their own processes and outcomes, rather than take over the political transition or negotiations.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM APPROACHES INFORMED BY ITI'S GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Access to Stakeholders

ITI acknowledges the importance of engaging with figures that are most likely to effect change or promote/stall a negotiation/transition process. Therefore, ITI maximises its impact in each engagement by leveraging its networks and directly engaging with political elites and senior leaders in the peace process, as far as possible.

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
ITI's nature as an independent organisation with a high level of connectivity to government and influential decision makers makes it an effective partner in the facilitation of peacemaking processes. This enables it to engage in a sensitive context such as Palestine/Israel in an adaptable manner, when necessary. Throughout the Israel/Palestine project, ITI, alongside with Beyond Conflict, recognised that access to influential Israeli participants would depend on the network and contacts provided by Blue White Future. ITI's parallel project with IPSA also contributed significantly to the choice of and access to high ranking Palestinians included in the peace process.

Beyond Conflict was also the key link between the ITI team and high-level US advisors[38] from the State Department and the White House, as well as Jewish American lobby groups. Access to the State Department and the White House, made possible through Beyond Conflict, provided the momentum in the initial engagements with Gilead Sher[39] of Blue White Future. This opened a channel of communication, creating a possibility for further engagement between ITI and the White House on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. However, President Donald Trump's rise to power and his administration's handling of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, including its deals and influence on the United Arab Emirates affected the foundations that had been built between the two groups through Beyond Conflict and ITI's facilitation.

ITI and Beyond Conflict's commitment and consultative and trust-building meetings in 2015 and 2016 eventually secured a meeting between a small group of Palestinians and Israelis in South Africa. Direct correspondence between ITI and Marwan Barghouti (a popular Fatah leader often likened to the 'Palestinian Mandela'),[40] via his wife Fadwa Barghouti,[41] and the planned visit to Hadarim Prison in Israel by Gilead Sher and Ami Ayalon[42] from Blue White Future to meet Marwan Barghouti, were symbolic steps to strengthen the process.

> Marwan Barghouti – a popular Fatah leader often likened to the 'Palestinian Mandela'

It should be noted that during the project ITI also tried to reach out to right-wing Israelis. Initially, the motivation was to bring this group to South Africa, but this did not take place as progress stalled. At the time, the Israelis felt that they were not negotiating with a cohesive unit and also felt that their adversaries were unreliable. Progress in the project was also affected by the Palestinian standpoint that there was not enough incentive to engage in another track process without an outcome in which they could believe.[43] Civil society and ordinary citizens were losing patience and confidence in the discussions between Palestinians and Israelis. Popular sentiment had also formed and strengthened around the notion of a two-state solution and as such any discussions needed to point towards that possibility.

Ability to Consult

Understanding the core issues and political context in which a negotiation process is occurring is an important aspect that negotiators or facilitating partners need to assess and determine before entering a peace process.

Contextual knowledge is often gained in the preparation phase of a project by conducting consultative or scoping engagements with key role players in the peace process.[44] This enables facilitators to grasp supporting data, facts and arguments pertaining to the particular context, which can also support the ability of facilitators to engage with all the stakeholders involved.

Through ITI's experience in peacebuilding, it recognises the need for solutions that cater to the specific conflict, as opposed to applying static and inflexible approaches. Consequently, ITI and Beyond Conflict's ability to consult with a broad range of stakeholders throughout the project proved particularly effective in the Palestine/Israel initiative.

The consultative process that ITI employs in the entry phase of a project also demonstrates the organisation's capabilities in managing multiple engagements to build and maintain trust relationships with various stakeholders. In this case, ITI had several trust-building meetings with Israelis and Palestinians in early 2015 in collaboration with Beyond Conflict. Furthermore, owing to the experience and wide range of expertise held by ITI's directorate and network of associates, the organisation is able to support a peace process efficiently by identifying opportunities, exposing potential challenges, and providing counsel to leaders and other political players on a wide range of issues. ITI was also able to develop the framework for the project, formulating its approach based on the political reality.

Some of the activities in the consultative phase of the project included a three-day visit to South Africa by members of Blue White Future and Beyond Conflict to strategise and design a possible way forward for the initiative; briefings with the South African Special Envoys for Peace in the Middle East; visits to Qatar and Israel where ITI engaged with leaders from Hamas, Fatah and the PLO to request their participation in track two talks; and corresponding with Marwan Barghouti via a letter appealing to Barghouti for his support and to provide names of persons who might be willing to engage with Israeli leaders in private and unofficial meetings. The purpose of these visits was to establish trust with the different groups while indicating that ITI and Beyond Conflict wanted to engage on a transparent and neutral basis.

Simultaneously, members of Beyond Conflict were consulting with moderate Jewish lobby groups in the US and moderate Israelis in Israel to evaluate their willingness to seek a lasting solution. The overall impression was that many moderate Israelis would support track two talks with their Palestinian neighbours yet had reservations whether a process would realise, partially owing to the right-wing shift in the Israeli government at that time.

Talks about Talks: Using Dialogue to Build Momentum

'Talks about talks' often take the form of private or secret talks where stakeholders can explore the various options for peace, convey their concerns and determine if there is sufficient common ground between them to motivate a formal and public negotiation process.[45] One important goal

> ITI recognises the need for solutions that cater to the specific conflict

of such a process is to ensure mutual commitment between stakeholders to pursue the next phase of the negotiation process. The challenge in conducting 'talks about talks' is to ensure that the pre-negotiations culminate in momentum towards formal negotiations. Because of the complex and sensitive relations between Israel and Palestine, this approach of initiating 'talks about talks' formed the basis of the engagement.

A private dialogue event between Israelis and Palestinians in Cape Town, South Africa in July 2016, as well as simultaneous engagements between Israeli civil society leaders and prominent South African stakeholders involved in the South African peace process, shows ITI's effective application and facilitation of dialogue as a tool for building momentum. Although the discussions were carried out on a private, unofficial basis, these first engagements between Israelis and Palestinians did see some progress in motivating for track two talks. At that stage of the project (July 2016), more opportunities for track two talks were being considered for 2017.

The discussions in Cape Town also motivated additional engagements between Israelis and Palestinians in Ramallah and Jerusalem. These discussions were conducted independently of ITI and Beyond Conflict, although both organisations were aware of them. At the time, participants were busy drafting a joint Israeli/Palestinian statement on a vision for the future, which would have been issued and backed by civil society members with sufficient stature in the Israeli political discourse. It should be noted that the aforesaid statement was not released to the broader public or Israeli corridors of leadership on an official basis.[46] However, it is possible that it may serve as a common platform, or common position that can take talks forward in the future.

Hosting Delegations in South Africa

One of ITI's most effective and strategic approaches is hosting delegations in South Africa. Through this ITI gives stakeholders the unique opportunity to engage with leaders and influential role players who were directly involved in the South African peace and transition process. This allows participants to gain insights into the South African process, while removing them from their domestic political context, complications and limitations.

One of the most impactful activities of the project took place on 17–19 July 2016. A delegation of Israeli civil society leaders visited South Africa and engaged in discussions with former South African president FW de Klerk[47] and activist and former judge on the Constitutional Court of South Africa Albie Sachs,[48] as well as a few other South African individuals who formed part of the South African peacemaking process. The purpose of this private workshop was to share the South African experience of transformation and to provide a space for Israeli leaders to think strategically and gain new ideas about the challenge of creating positive momentum for change without the support of the official leadership. The workshop engagements also sought to support a process of reshaping participants' views regarding productive engagements with Palestinians and different groupings of Israelis within Israel.

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MOMENTS OF TRANSFORMATION

In order to obtain a measurable response among participants engaging in dialogue discussions and processes facilitated by ITI, interviews were conducted with members of the ITI directorate and partner organisations involved in the Israel/Palestine initiative.

One engagement recalled by ITI directors relates to a meeting the team had with Amos Yadlin,[49] a retired major general in the Israel Defence Forces, who was the chief of Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate from 2006–2010 and is now the director of the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel. The intention of the meeting was to gain a better understanding of the scope of the project from the perspective of the Israeli security sector and to assess if Israelis would be open to the type of process ITI and Beyond Conflict were hoping to engage with. ITI director Ivor Jenkins[50] recalls that the meeting was a 'sobering moment for the team', as Yadlin communicated the attitude of the Israeli security sector regarding the conflict, Palestinians and South Africa.

The team came to realise that from the security sector's perspective, South Africa and consequently ITI were trying to promote a single-state solution in favour of the Palestinians. This was as a result of the ANC's historical support for and solidarity with Palestine. The team thus became aware of the fact that there would be several perceptions regarding the role and intentions of a South African organisation like ITI that would have to be overcome if it were to engage on this issue in the broader political and security sector in Israel.

However, as the conversation progressed and ITI began to share its approach to the process and its intention of being a neutral facilitating party, some signs emerged that Yadlin was acknowledging this approach and becoming less suspicious of ITI's involvement in a process of this kind. This was an indication that ITI's approach and methodology in a context such as Israel could serve to change some perspectives regarding South Africa and to establish an inclusive pathway to peace.

Another key moment recalled by Lee-Or Ankori-Karlinsky[51] took place during a visit by Israeli civil society members to Cape Town in July 2016. As part of the workshop hosted by ITI and Beyond Conflict the participants met with a range of South African personalities who had been directly involved in the South African transition process. Gilead Sher and Ami Ayalon of Blue White Future were able to meet Albie Sachs who, as a member of the Constitutional Committee and National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC, played an active role in the negotiations that led to South Africa's becoming a constitutional democracy. Ankori-Karlinsky recalls that this meeting was especially impactful for Sher, who also has a law background and could connect on a personal level with Sachs. The participants gained fascinating insights from Sachs regarding the negotiation process in South Africa; an experience that Sher found extremely valuable, saying that the trip to South Africa was worth it to have that conversation.

'The trip to South Africa was worth it to have that conversation'
– Gilead Sher

Gilead Sher ✔ @GileadSher · Jul 28, 2016

So honored and privileged to have met #peace & #humanrights hero Albie Sachs in #CapeTown »

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This instance provides an example of the value that ITI's access to key figures in the South African transition process has in impacting participants' perceptions of their own negotiation process and inspiring them to believe that a sustainable solution is attainable in their own context.

... inspiring them to believe that a sustainable solution is attainable in their own context

The Palestine/Israel project was a challenging initiative for ITI to manage, based on the fact that the geo-political environment is not conducive to significant progress. Through ITI and Beyond Conflict's facilitation of meetings between Israeli influencers and Palestinian leaders in 2016, options for new track two linkages and talks were being considered for 2017.[53] Independent bilateral meetings between influential Israelis and Palestinians were held in Ramallah and Jerusalem during which a joint Israel/Palestine statement on a vision for the future was being drafted, which would have been issued and backed predominantly by civil society. Unfortunately, the process could not progress further and as a result the additional objectives were not achieved.

Several factors contributed to the eventual stalling of the process, including a lack of additional funding. Long-term and resource-intensive commitment is needed to navigate the complex geopolitical nature of the Israel/ Palestine conflict. Moreover, it also became clear that extensive work still had to be done to overcome the distrust and general divide between many Israeli and Palestinian constituencies. Another factor was the overall fatigue in the peace process because of numerous attempts and failures at brokering a lasting agreement between Israel and Palestine.

Moreover, there was an asymmetry between the Israeli partners and Palestinian stakeholders involved in the project. On the Palestinian side, active political leaders and influential figures such as current Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh[54] and Ghassan Khatib[55] were willing to engage in the private and small dialogue sessions. However, partners from the Israeli right and centre-right – highly influential figures and civil society members with years of political/security sector experience and connections to active representatives in the Knesset – were no longer directly involved in active political governance.

Additionally, at the time of the intervention, progress in the project was also reliant on the continuation of the US' policies on the Israel/Palestine conflict, as set out under the administration of President Barack Obama. There was a firm belief that the US election in December 2016 would result in a smooth transition from one Democratic administration to another, with Hillary Clinton as the incumbent president of the US. Some contact with her campaign had already been established at that time. However, when Donald Trump and the Republican Party came to power it drastically changed the dynamics around the Palestine/Israel issue.

The Trump administration's introduction of the 'Deal of the Century', as well as the policy shift in December 2017 to formally recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem,

> When Donald Trump and the Republican Party came to power it drastically changed the dynamics

severely damaged two decades of American bipartisan approach to the conflict. This also affected the Israeli political space, with government policy on Palestine taking a more conservative and right-wing approach, further weakening the position of moderate and leftist Israeli constituencies and organisations. Further funding for the project became a challenge owing to Jewish American donors' shifting their attention to other issues and conflicts.

Furthermore, the South African government's decision to downgrade its embassy in Israel in September 2018 initiated the first phase in reducing diplomatic relations between the two countries. This resolution, taken at the request of the ANC, to recall the ambassador to South Africa injured ITI's position vis-à-vis Israel. The idea of South Africa's neutrality was damaged and existing pools of hostility towards the country worsened.

Going forward, should ITI be able to attain the appropriate funding and time to re-engage in the Israel/Palestine space, it will have to overcome significant issues, including the current Israeli perception of South Africa and the complex and narrow political space available as a result of the region's geopolitical configuration. Therefore, the following recommendations can be made:

> The idea of South Africa's neutrality was damaged and existing pools of hostility towards it worsened

• Negotiators should engage with a broad range of organisations and leverage their networks in order to link with government and other key stakeholders. In this case, ITI should attempt to consult with additional organisations in Israel to establish more direct engagements with a broader range of organisations and interest groups, not only relying on one organisation to facilitate linkages to government.

• National peace dialogues should be structured as long-term initiatives to allow the process to unfold at a pace that encourages and enables participation by all stakeholders. In this context, ITI should focus on a longer-term engagement with the Israel/Palestine issue, as a result of the sensitive and complex nature of this peacebuilding context.

• Inclusivity is a critical aspect of peace building initiatives. It is necessary to include all views and voices in the peacemaking process to ensure that resolutions have a high likelihood of being accepted by all parties. In the Israel/Palestine conflict it is necessary to engage with progressive Israelis, leftist groups and leaders in the left or centre-left.

• A unified approach and message from South African foreign affairs and special envoys regarding the country's approach to the Israel/Palestine conflict can assist to improve the fractured perception of South Africa that currently exists in Israel.

• To solve protracted conflicts, it may be necessary to widen the range of actors who can participate in processes. Different actors could bring additional capacity and skills to the process. Considering more regional actors in the approach to the project could also be beneficial, possibly by engaging with Egypt and the other Middle Eastern role players.

CONCLUSION

ITI's approach to the complexity of the Israel/Palestine initiative showcases the implementation of principles that are unique to the organisation. These can be applied effectively to other negotiation and transition processes when adjusted to fit the specific parameters of the conflict. ITI focused on creating awareness among participants about the importance of re-establishing dialogue, albeit on an unofficial level and under strict secrecy and security. ITI and Beyond Conflict managed to create a neutral and secure platform in Cape Town when hosting a meeting between influential Israelis and Palestinians and a workshop event with Israeli civil society leaders.

Moreover, ITI's political capital and the direct involvement of its directors in South Africa's negotiations also provided the credibility required to be a trusted facilitator within the Israel/Palestine context. Additionally, ITI was able to effectively develop the framework for the project with the contextual power dynamics in mind, thus formulating its approach based on the political reality. The success of ITI's approach can also be seen in the moments of transformation described.

ITI stressed that a sustainable and viable solution to achieve a two-state reality must be conceived by both parties involved and cannot be one sided. Therefore, the process of formulating the proposed solution must be consultative and inclusive to enable stakeholders on both sides of the conflict to maintain ownership of the process and the final product.

However, owing to the severe lack of trust between the Palestinian and Israeli leadership, the projected outcomes of the project were extremely difficult to achieve. Momentum was also stifled by the shift in geopolitical conditions at the end of 2016, as well as a lack of political will from Palestinian leadership to continue engaging in a strategy for a two-state solution that they could collectively support.

The success of ITI's approach can be seen in the moments of transformation described

PROJECT TIMELINE

2015

OCTOBER
Cyprus

Project conceptualised through meeting between Beyond Conflict and ITI directorate, as well as Israelis from Blue White Future. The three organisations discuss the possibility of initiating a process towards revitalising possible track two peace talks between Israel and Palestine.

NOVEMBER
South Africa

ITI agrees to test the project with leading Middle East experts in South Africa, as well as with leaders within the Palestinian community. Additional meetings take place with South African and European ambassadors other local experts, testing the idea of a South African agency such as ITI engaging in such a delicate matter.

DECEMBER
South Africa

Three-day visit by Gilead Sher and Ami Ayalon from Blue White Future, as well as Beyond Conflict's Tim Phillips and Lee-Or Ankori-Karlinsky, to discuss possible ways forward. Delegates also meet with the South African Special Envoys for Peace in the Middle East.

2016

FEBRUARY
Doha, Qatar; Ramallah, West Bank; Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Israel

ITI team engages with several Israeli and Palestinian influencers and leaders to establish trust and measure interest in a possible engagement. The visits also serve to express ITI and Beyond Conflict's intention of engaging on a transparent and neutral basis with both sides of the conflict. Palestinian leadership declines to engage with Israeli leaders/influencers at this time.

APRIL
Western Cape, South Africa

ITI continues to try to secure the participation of the Palestinian groups by again discussing the project with leaders from Fatah and Hamas during an April 2016 visit to South Africa (Intra-Palestine project). However, groups remain apprehensive to engage with Israelis.

MAY
Ramallah, West Bank; Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Israel

ITI team engages with Palestinian leaders to determine their interest in a follow-up Intra-Palestine dialogue to promote the idea of track two discussions with Israelis.

2016

27–29 JULY

Franschhoek, South Africa

Delegation visit by Israeli civil society leaders to engage with stakeholders involved in peacemaking process, including FW de Klerk and Judge Albie Sachs.

NOVEMBER

Tel Aviv, Israel

ITI team visits Israeli project team. Engaging with numerous new possible members to join the initiative.

7–8 NOVEMBER

Washington DC, US

Roelf Meyer briefs relevant state departments on the progress made in the Palestine and Israel/Palestine project.

27–29 JULY

Franschhoek, South Africa

Once-off bilateral meeting organised between two Israelis and two Palestinians to discuss possible track two talks.

NOVEMBER

South Africa

ITI briefs the South African Special Envoys to Israel and Palestine. Joint tactics and strategies for possible future bilateral meetings discussed.

LATE NOVEMBER

South Africa; Ramallah, West Bank

Similar briefings presented to different interested diplomatic missions in South Africa and at least seven missions in Ramallah.

1   Roelf Meyer, interviewed on 7 May 2020; Ivor Jenkins, interviewed on 8 May 2020; Mohammed Bhabha, interviewed on 11 May 2020.

2   Lee-Or Ankori-Karlinsky has served Beyond Conflict since 2012 as a Senior Program Officer. He assists in the development and implementation of project programmes. See https://beyondconflictint.org/ (Interviewed on 12 May 2020).

3   Beauchamp, Z. (2018). *"What Are Israel and Palestine? Why Are They Fighting?"*. Published by Vox.com on 14 May 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18079996/israel-palestine-conflict-guide-explainer

4   SBS News (2018). *"The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Explained"*, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-explained_2

5   Beauchamp, Z. (2018). *"What Are Israel and Palestine? Why Are They Fighting?"*. Published by Vox.com on 14 May 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18079996/israel-palestine-conflict-guide-explainer

6   Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker (updated July 2020), https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/israeli-palestinian-conflict

7   Ibid.

8   Hasan, H. (2017). *"Remembering the First Intifada"*. Published by Middle East Monitor on 9 December 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171209-remembering-the-first-intifada-2/

9   Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker (updated July 2020), https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/israeli-palestinian-conflict

10   Aljazeera, (2003). *"The second Intifada"*. Published on 4 December 2003, https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2003/12/20084101554875168.html.

11   Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker (updated July 2020), https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/israeli-palestinian-conflict

12   Beauchamp, Z. (2018). *"What Are Israel and Palestine? Why Are They Fighting?"*. Published by Vox.com on 14 May 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18079996/israel-palestine-conflict-guide-explainer

13   Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker (updated July 2020), https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/israeli-palestinian-conflict

14   Beaumont, P. (2016). *"Israel-Palestine: Outlook Bleak as Wave of Violence Passes Six-Month Mark"*. The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/31/israel-palestine-violence-knife-attacks-west-bank-gaza

15   Beyond Conflict (BC) is global non-profit organisation dedicated to supporting conflict stakeholders and actors in their efforts to achieve sustainable peace through peacebuilding and conflict transformation. BC works to promote positive social change

by applying real-world experience and insights from brain and behavioural science. See https://beyondconflictint.org/

16   Tim Phillips is the founder and CEO of Beyond Conflict. He has been involved in the peace and reconciliation processes in several nations, including Northern Ireland, El Salvador and South Africa. He has advised the United Nations, the US Department of State and the Council of Europe, and has been a frequent speaker in national and international forums, including the Council on Foreign Relations and the US Congress. See https://beyondconflictint.org/.

17   Blue White Future (BWF) is a non-partisan, registered Israeli non-profit organisation that seeks to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a 'two states for two peoples' approach. See http://bluewhitefuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Blue-White-Future-2013-Report.pdf

18   In Transformation Initiative. (2016). *"Neighbors Plan of Action"*. Internal document created on 3 August 2016.

19   In Transformation Initiative. (2016). *"Support and Advice for Transitional and Peacebuilding Processes in Africa and the Globe"*. GRANT: RAF 14/0038. 1 June 2015 to 30 June 2016.

20   IPSA is an NGO that works in the field of conflict resolution, reconciliation, nation building, state building, and peacebuilding in the form of dialogue and art. See https://www.facebook.com/IPSAPalestine/about/?ref=page_internal

21   The lack of trust was also noted as a major challenge among Palestine leadership.

22   The Knesset is the unicameral national legislature of Israel and serves as the legislative branch of the Israeli government. See https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/Pages/default.aspx

23   *In Transformation Integrated Governance Policy*. Version 1.4 (ratified on 31 January 2019), http://www.intransformation.org.za/wp-content/themes/intransformationinitiative/docs/integrated_governance_policy_1.4.pdf

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27   Marais, N; Davies, J. (2014). *"Deconstructing the Conditions that Enabled South Africa's Transition to Power-Sharing"*. White Paper prepared for the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, the Carter Center and Swisspeace for seminar "The Syria Transition Options project of The Carter Center".

28   Nathan, L. (2004). *"Accounting For South Africa's Successful Transition to Democracy"*. Crisis States Development Research Centre, LSE. Published June 2004.

29   Ibid.

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31 In Transformation Initiative and Beyond Conflict. (2016). *"Creating Positive Momentum in a Leadership Vacuum: Designing a Strategy Towards a Two-State Reality"*. Dialogue engagement strategy document compiled on 24 May 2016.

32 CODESA: The Convention for a Democratic South Africa was a negotiating forum called set up in 1991 after an agreement, the National Peace Accord, signed by the government and 18 other political organisations. See http://www.saha.org.za/news/2011/December/codesa_negotiations_began_in_december_1991_a_significant_transitional_step_towards_a_democratic_south_africa.htm

33 Lewicki, J. and Polin, B. (2013). *"The Role of Trust in Negotiation Processes"*. Handbook of Advances in Trust Research. Bachmann Print, 24 July 2013.

34 Paffenholz, T. (2015). *"Broadening Participation Project"*. Briefing Paper published by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies: Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding.

35 Paffenholz, T. and Ross, N. (2015). *"Inclusive Peace Processes: An Introduction"*. Development Dialogue 2015. Part 1.

36 Ibid.

37 Garcia, E. (2002). *"Owning the Process. Public Participation in Peacemaking"*. Accord Issue 12.2002.

38 Rob Malley (National Security Council under Barack Obama from 2014–2017); Martin Indyk (US Special Envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 2013–2014); Yael Lempert (Senior Director for the Levant, Israel and Egypt at the National Security Council from 2014–2017); Mara Rudman (Chief of Staff for the Office of the Special Envoy for Middle East Peace at the US Department of State).

39 Gilead Sher is Co-chair of BWF, attorney, senior researcher at the INSS National Security Institute and runs the Center for Applied Negotiation. See http://www.bluewhitefuture.org.il/our_people/

40 Marwan Barghouti: Fatah Central Committee; Member of the PLC; prominent political figure currently serving five life sentences in an Israeli prison. Often likened to the 'Palestinian Mandela', he is viewed as one of the strongest leadership candidates to succeed President Mahmoud Abbas. See https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/introduction

41 Fadwa Barghouti is the wife of Marwan Barghouti. Prominent member in Palestinian civil society as head of the Women's Union for Social Work, a group that works to increase the participation of women in the Palestinian resistance movement. See https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/introduction

42 Maj. Gen. Ami Ayalon is a former Naval Corp commander, former head of the General Security Service (GSS) and former representative of the Labour Party in the Knesset until 2009. See http://www.bluewhitefuture.org.il/our_people/

43 Du Toit, F. (2016). *"Support and Advice for Transitional and Peacebuilding Processes in Africa and the Globe"*. In Transformation Initiative GRANT RAF14/0038: Final Review October 2016

44 Lewicki, J. and Polin, B. (2013). *"The Role of Trust in Negotiation Processes"*. Handbook of Advances in Trust Research. Bachmann Print, 24 July 2013.

45 Anderlini S.N. (2012). *"Peace Negotiations and Agreements in Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Reconstruction"*. Published in Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action 2012.

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47 FW de Klerk was State President of South Africa from 1989 to 1994. In 1990 he opened negotiations with previously banned anti-apartheid organisations. De Klerk was appointed the Second Vice President in President Mandela's cabinet. https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/frederik-willem-de-klerk

48 Judge Albie Sachs: as a member of the ANC, he helped draft the ANC's Code of Conduct and statutes, was a member of the Constitutional Committee and National Executive Committee of the ANC, Director of Research for the Ministry of Justice, Constitutional Court Judge. See https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/judge-albert-louis-albie-sachs.

49 Amos Yadlin continues to serve as the Director of Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies. See https://www.iiss.org/governance/the-advisory-council/amos-yadlin.

50 Ivor Jenkins, interviewed on 8 May 2020.

51 Lee-Or Ankori-Karlinsky, interviewed on 12 May 2020.

52 Image of Judge Albie Sachs (left) and Gilead Sher (right) during a meeting in Cape Town in July 2016. https://twitter.com/GileadSher

53 Du Toit, F. (2016). *"Support and Advice for Transitional and Peacebuilding Processes in Africa and the Globe"*. In Transformation Initiative GRANT RAF14/0038: Final Review October 2016.

54 Dr Mohammed Shtayyeh was appointed prime minister of the Palestinian Authority (PA) on 10 March 2019. He succeeded Rami Hamdallah. In addition to his prime ministerial position, he is also Minister of Interior and Minister for Waqf and Religious Affairs. Involved in peace negotiations with Israel, including the 1991 Madrid peace conference and the US-led talks mediated by John Kerry in 2013–2014. See http://www.pecdar.ps/en/article/945/Dr-Mohammad-Shtayyeh

55 Ghassan Khatib is a member of the Palestinian People's Party (PPP) and a lecturer at Birzeit University. He was a member of the Palestinian negotiating teams to the 1991 Madrid talks. See https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/ghassan_khatib